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Abstract
A code of conduct is a set of rules adopted by transnational corporations (“TNCs”) to 
regulate mainly working conditions and the management of contract factories. TNCs adopted 
codes of conduct to cope with the rising criticisms from the public in late 1980s and 1990s about
unfair labor practices in contract factories in Third World countries. As the globalization of the 
economy progressed, like American TNCs, Japanese TNCs also transferred their production 
bases to developing countries like China, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia in search of  low 
wage labor. The development of a code of conduct in Japan is, however, quite different from that 
of American TNCs, and is very domestic and, in a sense, very “Japanese.” The purpose of this 
Note is to analyze, from a legal point of view, the development of Japanese codes of conduct and 
legal risks under Japanese law concerning unfair labor practices in foreign contract factories. 
Finally, this Note hypothesizes about the direction of the evolution of Japanese codes of conduct.
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The Rise of the Code of Conduct in Japan: Legal Analysis and Prospect 
Koji Ishikawa
Introduction
A code of conduct is a set of rules adopted by transnational corporations (“TNCs”)1 to 
regulate mainly working conditions and the management of contract factories. TNCs adopted 
codes of conduct to cope with the rising criticisms from the public in late 1980s and 1990s about
unfair labor practices in contract factories in Third World countries. Among the many stories 
that the media reported at that time, low wages in Nike’s contract factories in Indonesia2 and 
“sweatshops” in Saipan, the Northern Mariana Islands, for the U.S. mainland apparel industry3
would be the two most watched cases and fresh in our memory.
Like American TNCs, as the globalization of the economy progressed, Japanese 
corporations also transferred their production bases to foreign countries like China, Vietnam, 
Malaysia and Indonesia in search of low wage labor. The development of a code of conduct in 
1
 Among many terms to refer to corporations that operate in several countries such as “transnational 
corporations (TNCs),” “multinational corporations (MNCs)” and “multinational enterprises (MNEs),” in 
this note “transnational corporations (TNCs)” will be used based upon the “U.N. Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations” discussed below. See, generally, David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to 
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 907 (2003).
2 See, e.g., Edward A. Gargan, International Business: An Indonesian Asset Is Also a Liability; Low 
Wages Woo Foreign Business, But the Price Is Worker Poverty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1996, at 35.
3 See, e.g., Jeff Wong, Top U.S. Companies Being Sued for “America’s Worst Sweatshop”, The 
Associated Press, Jan. 14, 1999.
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Japan is, however, quite different from that of American TNCs, and is very domestic and, in a 
sense, very “Japanese.”
The purpose of this note is to analyze from a legal point of view the development of 
Japanese codes of conduct, and to hypothesize about the direction of its evolution. Before 
analyzing Japanese codes of conduct, Part I briefly describes the development of codes of 
conduct in the international community and the efforts made there by public and  private 
initiatives. Part II discusses legal risks under Japanese law concerning unfair labor practices in 
foreign contract factories. Next, Part III describes two recent corporate scandals that drove 
Japanese corporations to the adoption of codes of conduct, and discusses the development of 
Japanese codes of conduct. Finally, Part IV analyzes the legal effect under Japanese law of the 
adoption of a code of conduct, and hypothesizes about its future.
I. Brief History of the Development of Codes of Conduct in the International Community
Roughly speaking, codes of conduct in the international community have been developed 
by three parties, which are international organizations like the United Nations, TNCs, and other 
third parties such as non-governmental organizations. Before discussing the development of 
codes of conduct in Japan, a brief survey of those in the international community would be 
helpful in understanding the uniqueness of Japanese codes of conduct.
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A. Code of Conduct by International Organizations
As the globalization of the economy progressed, TNCs were motivated by economic 
reasons to transfer their production bases to developing countries, such as Latin American 
countries and South East Asian countries, for low wage labor and less employee’s rights 
protection. Simultaneously, however, the international community increased criticism of TNCs' 
behavior in the host countries4, and various organizations, from governmental to non-
governmental, have drafted guidelines to control TNCs’ business conduct.
U.N. Code.  Among the many efforts to create norms to regulate the business conduct of 
TNCs by international organizations, the United Nations’ “Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations” in 1974 (“U.N. Code”) 5 will be mentioned fi rst. The U.N. Code had been under 
development since 1974, when the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. established a 
commission on TNCs. The commission was directed to study the role of TNCs in the 
international economy and to draft a code of conduct for them6, which later became the U.N. 
Code. The U.N. Code consists of 71 articles, but the wording is somewhat generic7 and no 
4 One of the most illustrative cases would be the involvement of International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corporation, an American TNC, in the 1974 coup d'état in Chile, which overthrew then President 
Salvador Allende. David Binder (non-titled column), N. Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1974, at 14. 
5 The final draft of the U.N. Code is attached to Economic and Social Council, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 
7(d), at 1, U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990).
6 Review of the U.N. Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, Hearings Before the House Comm. 
on Foreign Affairs, Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations, 100th Cong. May 7, 
1987, at 3 (statement of Hon. Alan Keyes, Assistant Secretary of State) [hereinafter Hearings].
7 Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrére, Doing Business in China and Latin America: 
Development in Comparative and International Labor Law, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 663, 669 
(1995).
3561- text.native.1083271552 4
concrete burden is imposed on TNCs. For example, Article 14 regarding human rights reads 
“[t]ransnational corporations shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
countries in which they operate.” The U.N. Code, however, met strong oppositions from 
industrialized countries, especially the United States8, and was never officially adopted.
Global Compact.  The U.N.’s other major effort after the U.N. Code was the Global 
Compact. The Global Compact was first addressed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the 
World Economic Forum on January 13, 19999. He appealed to business leaders in attendance 
from all over the world to join an international initiative, the Global Compact, to promote human 
rights, improve labor conditions, and protect the environment. The Global Compact’s 
operational phase was officially launched at U.N. Headquarters in New York on July 26, 200010. 
Although major U.N. agencies and TNCs expressed support for the Global Compact, it faced 
criticism from member state governments, especially the United States, the business community 
and even academics, and has not accomplished the major success that was expected when it was 
launched11.
OECD’s Guidelines.  In addition to the two U.N. major efforts noted above, “Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises” drafted by the Organization for Economic Corporation and 
8 Hearings, supra note 6, at 4.
9 Global Compact web site. Available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal (last visited on Apr. 20, 
2004).
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS, 115 (2003) (hereinafter Sethi); William H. 
Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 501, 504 (2001).
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Development (“OECD”) in 1976 (revised in 2000) 12 (“OECD Guidelines”) should be mentioned 
here. The OECD’s Guidelines are recommendations by the governments of thirty OECD 
member countries13. The OECD Guidelines are voluntary principles consisting of three parts: 
Part I The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; Part II Implementation Procedures of 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and Part III Commentaries. They provide 
norms for a wide variety of areas such as employment, industrial relations, human rights, 
environment, disclosure, competition, taxation, and science and technology. One thing unique in 
the OECD Guidelines is that they have a complaint procedure for workers and trade unions14. 
ILO Code. The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) also drafted a code of conduct 
entitled “Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises of Social 
Policy” 15 (“ILO Code”). The scope of the ILO Code is wider than the OECD Guidelines and 
covers job creation, investment in the local economy and subcontracting, etc. 
12 Available at http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,2350,en_2649_34889_1_119820_1_1_1,00.html
(last visited on Apr. 20, 2004). For the revision in 2000, see, generally, OECD, Review of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises – Framework for Review (May 21, 1999), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2439005_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited on 
Apr. 20, 2004)
13 Eight non-member countries also expressed their endorsements for the OECD Guidelines. These 
countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.
14 OECD Guidelines, Part II Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises; Supra note 7, at 671.
15 Available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm (last visited on Apr. 20, 
2004).
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Both the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Code lack a penal or enforcement system for 
violations thereof, which leaves some question as to their actual influence16.
B. Code of Conduct by Private Initiatives
Side by side with the efforts by international organizations, TNCs themselves had started 
creating certain norms in the 1970s to regulate themselves, in response to increased criticism. 
Surveying these private initiatives, the Sullivan Statement of Principles17 concerning business
with South Africa in the apartheid era, Levi-Strauss’s Terms of Engagement and Guidelines18, 
and Nike’s Code of Conduct19 are worth mentioning here. Levi-Strauss’s Terms of Engagement 
and Guidelines are said to be the first code of conduct by TNCs, and Nike’s Code of Conduct
16 Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1963, 1970 (1996); Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational 
Corporations, and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 261, 273 (1997); 
Christopher R. Coxson, The 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: 
Promoting Labor Law Reforms Through the ILO as an Alternative To Imposing Coercive Trade 
Sanctions, 17 DICK. J. INT’L L. 469, 478-481 (1999); Jane C. Hong, Enforcement of Corporate Codes of 
Conduct: Finding a Private Right of Action for International Laborers Against MNCs for Labor Rights 
Violations, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 41, 48 (2000); Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and 
Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1075, 1091 (2002).
17 Leon H. Sullivan, Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa, reprinted in 24 
I.L.M. 1496 (1985).
18 Available at http://www.levistrauss.com/responsibility/conduct/guidelines.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 
2004).
19 Available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/gc/mp/pdf/English.pdf (last visited on Apr. 20, 2004).
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was in part a response to criticism20 of Nike’s unfair labor practices, such as child labor, in its 
Indonesian contract factories.
The Sullivan Statement of Principles.  The Sullivan Statement of Principles was a set of 
principles advocated in 1976 by Leon H. Sullivan, a pastor of the Zion Baptist Church and a 
member of General Motor’s board of directors. It focused on regulating American TNCs doing 
business in South Africa during the apartheid era21. Initially twelve major American TNCs 
expressed their support for the principles. The Sullivan Statement of Principles consists of six 
principles dealing with anti-discrimination (Principle I), fair employment practice (Principle II), 
equal payment (Principle III), job training program (Principle IV), promotion of non-white 
management (Principle V) and improvement of the quality of life outside the workplace
(Principle VI)22. The principles themselves do not have penal provision for violations thereof. 
However, Arthur D. Little, Inc., a reputable consulting firm, undertook to oversee the function of 
the principles and to assess the progress made by the signatory companies23. The Sullivan 
Statement of Principles, however, is not thought to have been a great success and it is said to 
have failed to deliver fully on its promise and potential24.
20 Among the literature and media coverage, “The Big One” (1999), a movie directed by American
filmmaker, Michael Moore, would be a good example of the Nike criticism. In this movie, Michael 
Moore discussed with Philip H. Knight, President and CEO of Nike, child labor in Nike’s contract 
factories in Indonesia.
21 Supra note 11, Sethi, at 95.
22 Supra note 17.
23 Supra note 11, Sethi, at 104.
24 Id. at 109. Supra note 7, at 666.
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Levi-Strauss’s Terms of Engagement and Guidelines.  Levis-Strauss's "Business Partner 
Terms of Engagement and Guidelines for Country Selection" (“Levi-Strauss Code”) that was 
adopted in 1991 is believed to be the first code of conduct among TNCs25. The Levi-Strauss 
Code consists of five major aspects: ethical standards, legal requirements, environmental 
requirements, community involvement and employment standards. The employment standards 
cover child labor, prison labor/forced labor, disciplinary practices, working hours, wages and 
benefits, freedom of association, discrimination, health and safety26. One unique element here 
would  be the respect for freedom of association, which is not included in Nike’s code of 
conduct, which is explained below.
Nike’s Code of Conduct.  Nike's Code of Conduct (“Nike Code”) was established in 
1992 in response to criticism about its unfair labor practices, such as child labor, in Nike’s 
Indonesian contract factories27. The code consists of a preamble and six sections, covering 
forced labor, child labor, compensation, benefits, hours of work/overtime, 
environment/safety/health, and documentation and inspection28. Unlike Levi-Strauss’s Code and 
25 Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The Limits and 
Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 111, 128 (1998). See, also, Levi Strauss’s web site at 
http://www.levistrauss.com/responsibility/index.htm (claiming that “[i]n 1991, we became the first 
worldwide company to establish a comprehensive ethical code of conduct for manufacturing and 
finishing contractors working with the company”) (last visited on Apr. 20, 2004).
26 Supra note 18.
27 The actual businesses of Nike are designing and marketing of sports gears. Nike does not own a 
manufacturing factory and outsources its production to foreign contract factories. See, generally, supra
note 11, Sethi, at 152.
28 Supra note 19.
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Gap Inc.’s, Code of Vendor Conduct29, the Nike Code does not mention freedom of association 
for the workers. Although the contents are standard and there is nothing special therein, a 
distinctive feature of the Nike Code, or more precisely, the enforcement of the Nike Code is its 
monitoring and checking system. Nike established a Labor Practices Department in 1996 to 
check whether the performance of Nike’s contractors meets the Nike Code. In addition, Nike 
hired Ernst & Young, one of the big four accounting firms, to independently monitor pay records, 
overtime compensation requirements and other local law compliance30.
The motives of the adoption of codes of conduct by TNCs, such as Levi-Strauss and Nike,
might vary. Some might have not originated from a purity of heart to care for the workers in the 
foreign contract factories31. It would be undeniable, however, that these codes heightened the 
standards and were a driving force to improve the awareness of the management of TNCs and 
foreign contract factories, and, possibly, improved working conditions32.
29 Available at http://www.gapinc.com/social_resp/ifpr/op&p/code_of_vendor_conduct.pdf (last visited 
on Apr. 20, 2004).
30 See, generally, Ryan P. Toftoy, Now Playing: Corporate Code of Conduct in the Global Theater. Is 
Nike Just Doing It?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 905, 923.
31 Sol Picciotto, Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 131, 139 (2003).
32 Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1431, 1437 (2002).
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II. Legal Risks under Japanese Law Arising from Unfair Labor Practices in 
A Foreign Contract Factory
Although Japan became the second largest economy in the 1970s, fortunately or 
unfortunately, Japan has had nothing to do with the international efforts mentioned above to 
regulate TNCs’ business conduct in developing countries. Japan was neither a wrongdoer (at 
least directly) nor a victim of TNCs malfeasance, and was just out of the loop as usual.
There seemed to be three major reasons behind this history. Firstly, since the end of
World War II, there has been actually no report of serious unfair labor practice, such as child 
labor, indentured labor or slave labor, in Japan. This is mainly because of the Japanese 
immigration policy33 that prohibits, in principle, immigration of simple labor34. Secondly, there 
has been no report of serious unfair labor practices in the foreign contract factories of Japanese 
corporations35. Thirdly, there is little legal risk to which Japanese corporations are exposed 
33 Shutsunykoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei h [Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law] 
(Cabinet Order No. 319 of October 4, 1951; last revised on June 4, 2003), Article 7(1)(ii) and Annex 1-2; 
Shutsunykoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei h dai nanaj daiikk dainig no kijyun wo sadameru shrei 
[Ministerial Order Providing Standards of Article 7(1)(ii) of Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Law] (Ministry of Justice Order No. 16 of May 24, 1990; last revised on Feb. 27, 2004). The 
law and ministerial order, in principle, allow only foreign workers who have an expertise, such as a 
corporate executive, professor, banker, lawyer or scientist, to work in Japan.
34 Before World War II, however, Japan also had a history of child labor and indentured labor, which 
were sometimes deemed legal at that time. A typical case was that, in a lean year, tenant farmers in the 
Tohoku region (northern Japan) would send, or sometimes sell, their children to factories as workers or to 
wealthy families as domestic help.
35 There is one widely reported case that an American subsidiary of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation was 
sued by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for sexual harassment in a factory located 
in America. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper] (morning edition), Apr. 24, 1996, at 13. This 
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under Japanese law, relating to serious unfair labor practices in their foreign contract factories.
Although there are several laws possibly applicable to such issues as follows, each of them has 
difficulty in its application and cannot have a direct impact on Japanese corporations.
A. Observation of Treaties under the Japanese Constitution
The Constitution of Japan36 provides for the observation of treaties and established 
international law. Article 98(2) states “[t]he treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of 
nations shall be faithfully observed.”37 This obligation, however, is only applicable to the 
Japanese government and not to Japanese citizens and corporations, because the subject of this 
obligation is the Japanese government. Therefore, even in cases where the conduct of a Japanese 
citizen or corporation in a foreign country is contrary to “[t]he treaties concluded by Japan and 
established laws of nations,” Article 98(2) of the Constitution does not provide victims of such 
conduct with a cause of action before the Japanese courts.
case was, however, between two developed countries so that the context is different from cases to which 
the codes of conduct discussed in this note are applied.
36 Nihonkoku Kenp, [The Constitution of Japan]. Official English translation is available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (last visited 
on Apr. 20, 2004). 
37 It is the established view among scholars that, based on Article 98(2) of the Constitution, treaties, 
conventions, compacts and other international agreements are given precedence over national laws of 
Japan. The argument among scholars whether superiority between the Constitution and treaties, 
conventions, compacts and other international agreements is not settled yet. See, KJI SATO, KENP
[CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 30 (3d ed. 1995) (1981). The Supreme Court held, however, that treaties, 
conventions, compacts and other international agreements can be a violation of the Constitution. See, 
Sunagawa case, 13 KEISH [Supreme Court Criminal Case Reporter] 3225 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1959). The 
main issue in the Sunagawa case was the constitutionality of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The 
Supreme Court held that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was constitutional.
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 B. Product Liability Claim
Under the Product Liability Law38, importers shall be liable for damages caused by 
defects in imported products. Article 3 of the law provides as follows (note: by Article 2(3)(i), 
“importer” is included in the definition of “manufacturer, etc.” below):
Article 3 (Product Liability)
The manufacturer, etc. shall be liable for damages caused by the injury, when he injured 
someone's life, body or property by the defect in his delivered product which he 
manufactured, processed, imported or put the representation of name, etc. as described in 
subsection 2 or 3 of section 3 of Article 2. However, the manufacturer, etc. is not liable 
when only the defective product itself is damaged.
If there is a defect in an imported product and a consumer suffered damages thereby, the 
consumer can sue the importer for the damages caused by the defective imported product. 
Product Liability Law defines “defect” as “lack of safety that the product ordinarily should 
provide, taking into account the nature of the product, the ordinarily foreseeable manner of use 
of the product, the time when the manufacturer, etc. delivered the product, and other 
circumstances concerning the product.”39 Thus, “defect” under the Product Liability Law is 
limited to defects in product safety that might harm consumers, and does not include so- called 
“social quality” such as the fact that the product was produced without child labor or forced 
38 Seizbutsu Sekinin H [Product Liability Law], Law No. 85 of July 1, 1994. Tentative English 
translation by the Japanese government is available at http://www.consumer.go.jp/e/pla/index.html (last 
visited on Apr. 20, 2004).
39 Article 2(2) of the Product Liability Law.
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labor, etc40. Therefore, in cases where imported products that were produced by child labor or 
forced labor, etc. in foreign contract factories caused injury to a Japanese consumer, the Product 
Liability Law does not provide the consumer with a cause of action before the Japanese courts,
as long as the product is free from defects in its safety.
C. Tort Claim
Under Japanese law, if the tortfeasor is a Japanese citizen or a corporation incorporated 
under Japanese law, victims of the tort in a foreign country can sue the tortfeasor in both 
Japanese court41 and the court of the country whe re the tort was done42. This theory is, however, 
applicable only to cases in which a Japanese citizen or corporation is directly involved in the 
case; in other words, in cases where tort, namely, unfair labor practice in our context, was done 
solely by a foreign contract factory, Japanese law does not provide jurisdiction over the Japanese 
party behind the contract factory. Workers in foreign contract factories, therefore, have to prove 
that the Japanese party is the real tortfeasor or joint tortfeasor and there is a reasonable causation 
between the act of the Japanese party behind the contract factory and the damages the victims 
suffered.  This proof would be very difficult in a typical contract relation between a Japanese 
party and its foreign contract factory.
40 Economy Planning Agency Consumer Affairs 1st Section, Chikujy kaisetsu seizbutsu sekinin h
[Annotated Product Liability Law] 65 (1995).
41 Article 709 of Minp [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of Apr. 27, 1896 (last revised on Aug. 1, 2003); Article 
4(1) of Minji Soshh [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of June 26, 1996 (last revised on July 25, 
2003). See Malaysian Airline case, 35 MINSH [Supreme Court Civil Case Reporter] 1224 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 
16, 1980).
42 Hiroshi Sano, Fuh kichi no kankatsuken [Jurisdiction Over International Tort], in SHIN SAIBAN 
JITSUMU TAIKEI VOL. 3 KOKUSAI MINJI SOSHOH (ZAISANHKANKEI) [New Court Practice Collection 
Vol. 3 International Civil Procedure Law] 91 (Akira Takakuwa & Masato Dgauchi eds., 2002).
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Also, even if workers in foreign contract factories could prove that the real tortfeasor is 
the Japanese party and thereby established a jurisdiction over the Japanese party before a 
Japanese court, the Japanese court still reserves the right to deny the jurisdiction for the reason 
that having the case in Japan does not stand to reason43. A recent Supreme Court case also held 
that, if the court recognizes a circumstance in which having the case before a Japanese court is 
contrary to the ideas of fairness, adequacy and promptness of court procedure, the Japanese court 
does not have jurisdiction over such an international litigation44. Based upon this tendency of the 
Supreme Court, if one or both parties are located in a foreign country, and the tort occurred there, 
it is very likely that the Japanese court would deny the jurisdiction over that matter. Accordingly, 
a tort claim by workers in foreign contract factories against the Japanese corporation behind their 
employers cannot help but give concrete and imminent pressure on Japanese corporations and 
their directors.
D. Director’s Fiduciary Duty
The legal risk relating to unfair labor practices in foreign contract factories might be 
realized from inside of the corporation, rather than from outside pressure such as treaties, 
product liability or tort claim. The Commercial Code of Japan45 provides for the fiduciary duty 
of directors4647. Based on this fiduciary duty, directors shall be responsible for constructing a risk 
43 Malaysian Airline case, supra note 41, at 1226.
44 51 MINSH [Supreme Court Civil Case Reporter] 4055, 4059 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997).
45 SHOH [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of Mar. 9, 1899 (last revised on Aug. 1, 2003).
46 Article 254(3) of the Commercial Code; Article 644 of the Civil Code. So-called corporate law is 
provided as a part of the Commercial Code.
47 Under Japanese corporate law, fiduciary duty does not clearly branch into duty of care and duty of 
loyalty. Especially, duty of loyalty is not recognized as an independent duty of directors. The term 
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control system corresponding to the scale and characteristics of the business.48 If a director of 
Japanese corporation realized that an unfair labor practice occurs in a foreign contract factory 
and that it attracts media attention and is reported widely and thereby the reputation or business 
of the corporation is damaged, the director might be liable for such damages because of a 
violation of his fiduciary duty and could be sued in a shareholders representative suit. Although 
there seems to be no such case in Japan so far49, the required level of the fiduciary duty is 
heightened as the complexity and specialization in society progresses50. Also, the consciousness 
of the general public regarding international human rights is also improved. The above scenario 
is now more realistic under current circumstances than it was in the past.
“fiduciary duty” (zenkan chi gimu) is used to refer to both duty of care and duty of loyalty. See 
generally, SHINPAN CHSHAKU KAISHA HVOL. 6, KABUSHIKI KAISHA NO KIKAN (2) §§254~280 [NEW 
EDITION ANNOTATED CORPORATE LAW VOL. 6, ORGANS OF JOINT STOCK CORPORATION(2) §§254~280] 
28 (Katsuro Ueyanagi et al. eds., Revised edition 1987)
48 Daiwa Bank shareholders representative suit, 1721 Hanrei Jih 3, 32 (Osaka District Court, Sep. 20, 
2000). Daiwa Bank suffered a loss of about $1.1 billion due to off-the-book transactions of U.S. treasury 
bill for 11 years by an executive vice president of the New York branch. Daiwa Bank had to withdraw 
from the U.S. market because of this scandal.
49 There is no official online database covering all published cases in Japan. There are, however, several 
private vendors providing online database in Japan, like Westlaw or Lexis.
50 SHINPAN CHSHAKU MINPVOL. 16, SAIKEN (2) §§623~666 [NEW EDITION ANNOTATED CIVIL CODE 
VOL. 16, CREDITOR’S RIGHTS (2) §§623~666] 224 (Tru Ikuyo & Toshio Hironaka ed., Revised edition 
1989).
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III. Code of Conduct of Japanese Corporations
A. Code of Conduct for Quality Control
Despite the relatively low legal risk as discussed above, Japanese corporations are 
becoming more conscious of the importance of the control of contract factories. The motive for 
the adoption of a code of conduct is, however, quite different from that of TNCs, and is very 
domestic or “Japanese”: it is for quality control of products in domestic contract factories, not 
for preventing unfair labor practices in foreign contract factories. The followings are two 
illustrative cases that drove Japanese corporations to considering a code of conduct.
1. Sony Playstation Case51
In Fall 2001, cadmium exceeding the environmental standard was found in connection 
cables of the Playstation 2, Sony’s consumer video game console, in Holland. As a result, Sony 
had to recall the Playstation 2 from the European market and temporarily suspend shipments. 
The connection cable was procured from a Sony’s contract factory in China, and Sony realized 
from this case that legal compliance in a foreign contract factory could affect Sony’ reputation. 
One Sony manager said “so-called ‘source management’ became crucial.”52 In response to this 
case, Sony conducted onsite audits in 4,500 contract factories and checked whether the contract 
51 Europe and America Go Ahead in Corporate Social Responsibility – Onsite Audit in Contract 
Factories, Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper], Aug. 3, 2003 (morning edition), at 29. 
“Shimbun” in Japanese means “newspaper.”
52 The Economy Has Changed (2) – Customer Has Changed: Selling Reliance and Building New 
Affiliation, Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper], May 16, 2003 (morning edition), at 1.
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factories complied with local environmental and other regulations , including protection of 
human rights.
2. Prima Meat Packers Case53
Prima Meat Packers, Ltd. (“Prima”), the second largest meat packer in Japan, is a major 
manufacturer of a bacon product that is one of the private brands of Aeon Co., Ltd., the second 
largest supermarket chain in Japan. Prima used albumin in the bacon product, which was 
prohibited under its contract with Aeon, without notifying Aeon. Albumin is an allergenic
material and required to be labeled on the product by the Food Sanitation Law54. Aeon did not 
label the use of albumin on the product because Prima had not notified Aeon thereof, which 
constituted a violation of the Food Sanitation Law by Prima. Since the bacon products were sold 
as an Aeon private brand product, Aeon was also exposed to a legal risk of consumer claims if 
the albumin caused an allergic reaction in any consumer who ate Aeon’s products. In response to 
Prima’s prohibited use of albumin, Aeon indicted Prima for a violation of the Food Sanitation 
53 Aeon Withdraws Prima Meat Packer’s Products: Use of Prohibited Material Under Contract,  Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper], Feb. 2, 2003 (morning edition), at 35; Prima Meat Packers 
Conceded the Use of Prohibited Material in Bacon Product – Reexamine All Products, Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper], Feb. 3, 2003 (morning edition), at 13.
54 Law No. 233 of Feb. 24, 1947 (last revised on May 30, 2003). Article 19.
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Law55, which was extremely exceptional in a Japanese corporate culture that tends to avoid legal 
disputes as much as possible56.
B. The Three Generations of Japanese Codes of Conduct
After a series of quality control problems in contract factories that significantly affected 
corporate brands and consumer credibility, Japanese corporations started paying more attention 
to checking the management and operation of contract factories through a code of conduct. 
Unfortunately, there is no official and unofficial data showing the number of Japanese 
corporations that adopted a code of conduct applicable to its contract factories. As far as the 
author was able to research, three public corporations, Prima, Bandai Co., Ltd., a major toy 
manufacture, and Aeon adopted a code of conduct. The codes of conduct of Prima and Aeon are 
posted on their web sites, but Bandai does not make its code of conduct available publicly57.
In contrast to codes of conduct of TNCs that focus on preventing unfair labor practices in 
foreign contract factories, the Japanese codes of conduct have originated with a focus on 
regulating much broader aspects and have not paid specific attention to the prevention of unfair 
labor practices in foreign contract factories. Subject to its scope and legal nature, the 
55 Aeon Indicted Prima Meat Packers for Use of Prohibited Material, Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei 
Newspaper], Feb. 4, 2003 (morning edition), at 39. After receiving the indictment by Aeon, the 
Metropolitan Police Department searched the headquarter of Prima and heard from Prima employees as 
witnesses . The formal criminal procedure, however, was not commenced.
56 Prima Meat Packers Problem Creates a Sensation Among Contract Factories, Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun 
[Nikkei Industry Newspaper], Oct. 1, 2003, at 21. Some contractors said that they “never heard of such 
indictment” and sympathized with Prima.
57 The author requested Bandai to disclose the code of conduct, but they refused. E-mail dated Feb. 23, 
2004 from Bandai Customer Center to the author (on file with the author).
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development of the Japanese codes of conduct can be classified as the following three 
generations. 
The First Generation
• Abstract and spiritual (does not create any legal rights or duties)
• Unilateral expression of policy (counter signature by the contract factory is not 
required)
• No reference to unfair labor practices and human rights
The Second Generation
• Abstract and spiritual (does not create any legal rights or duties between the 
corporation and the contract factory)
• Unilateral expression of policy (counter signature by the contract factory is not 
required)
• Some reference to unfair labor practices or human rights or both
The Third Generation
• Concrete and detailed (creates legal rights and duties between the corporation and the 
contract factory)
• Legal nature is an agreement (counter signature by the contract factory is required)
• Specifically focusing on the prevention of unfair labor practices or protection of 
human rights or both
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As seen above, it can be noted that there are three movements in the development from 
the first generation to the third generation: from abstract and spiritual wordings to concrete and 
detailed ones; from an unilateral expression of policy to a bilateral legal agreement; and the 
broad scope of application to focusing on labor practices or human rights or both.
In the light of this classification, Prima’s code of conduct is an example of the first 
generation, and Aeon’s code of conduct can be classified in the second generation. There is no 
Japanese code of conduct that can be classified in the third generation so far. In 2002, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., which has a more advanced code of conduct that can be classified as the third 
generation in Japan, acquired The Seiyu, Ltd., Japan’s fourth largest supermarket chain58. 
Through this acquisition, it is expected that the so-called third generation code of conduct will 
penetrate into the Japanese business community.
C. Prima Meat Packers, Ltd. Code of Conduct59
Prima’s code of conduct consists of nine relatively spiritual and abstract principles as 
follows60:
Preamble The highest priority of Prima Meat Packers is to contribute to society, and 
we shall be always thankful to our customers and devote ourselves to food 
production.
58 Wal-Mart acquires Seiyu, Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper], Mar. 15, 2002 (morning 
edition), at 1.
59 Japanese version is available at http://www.primaham.co.jp/company/kihan.htm (last visited on Apr. 20, 
2004).
60 English translation by the author.
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We, as an economic entity, pursue profits through fair competition, but, at 
the same time, we shall make our best efforts to be a useful presence in
society.
Our management and employees shall fully understand the above spirits, 
and, based on the following nine principles, shall observe national and 
international laws, international rules and their spirits, and shall behave 
with common sense.
Principle I Being honest and being faithful to basics shall be the principle in every
aspects of corporate activities, and law and internal rule, etc. shall be 
observed.
Principle II “Nothing is more important than product and quality” and “service for 
customers with constant innovation” shall be the principles, and we shall 
manufacture products with a priority on customer satisfaction and reliance.
Principle III Fair, transparent and free competition shall be observed in business. We 
shall maintain healthy relations with politics and the government.
Principle IV We shall actively and fairly disclose corporate information, such as 
operation and business activities, to consumers and shareholders, etc.
Principle V We shall make efforts to protect the environment in business.
Principle VI We shall achieve employees welfare, keep a safe and worker-friendly 
workplace and respect the dignity and personality of employees.
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Principle VII We shall firmly confront antisocial organizations that threaten the order 
and safety of civil society.
Principle VIII We shall respect the culture and customs in foreign countries, and do 
business that contributes to local development.
Principle IX Management shall understand that the realization of the spirit of this code 
of conduct is its role, inform related parties of this code of conduct,
prepare internal systems and nurture ethics.
 Prima’s code of conduct, however, does not specifically focus on controlling contract 
factories; rather, it is an expression of an unilateral resolution of Prima itself. There is no section 
therein that deals with labor standards in its contract factories, which can be said to be the core 
of the codes of conduct adopted by TNCs. Also, Prima’s code of conduct does not create legal 
rights or duties of Prima or its contract factories. Surprisingly, although Prima’s code of conduct 
was established after the albumin scandal, there is no section, except for the highly spiritual and 
abstract Principle I and Principle II, that details how to implement concretely quality control and 
legal compliance in both Prima and its contract factories. Generally speaking, Prima’s code of 
conduct is a kind of extension of corporate precepts and very remote from the common 
understanding of a code of conduct in the international community.
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D. Aeon Code of Conduct61
Aeon’s code of conduct, which can be said to be of the second generation, is more 
specific and closer to the codes of conduct in the international community.
Aeon’s code of conduct, established in April 2003, consists of six parts: “Preamble,”
“The Aeon Code of Conduct Commitment,” “Our Promise to Customers,” “Aeon and Local 
Community,” “Aeon and Its Business Partners,” and “Aeon and Its Shareholders.” We can see 
also here, the same as with Prima’s code of conduct, that a code of conduct of a Japanese 
corporation covers not only contract factories but also very broad areas, such as customer 
relations and investor relations, which are a quite unique element compared with a TNC’ s code 
of conduct.
Among the six parts of Aeon’s code of conduct, “Aeon and Its Business Partners”
(“Aeon Code”) is equivalent to the code of conduct discussed in this note in the context of labor 
standards in contract factories. The Aeon Code consists of the following preamble and five 
principles.
Preamble Aeon respects innovative business partners who help the company achieve 
its objective of “Customer Satisfaction.” We strive to work as equals with 
our business partners, dealing fairly and working for our mutual 
prosperity.
61 English version is available at http://www.aeon.info/aboutaeon/aeon_code_of_conduct/en/ (last visited 
on Apr. 20, 2004).
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The term “business partner” refers to all of the partners with whom we 
conduct business, including those who provide retail products, facilities 
services, and our retail tenants.
Principle I62 At Aeon, we corporate with our business partners, all of whom are 
important to us, moving forward together to develop innovative business 
models that will open the gate to the next era.
We cultivate storing relations with our partners, together pursuing 
innovative business practices, better products, better services, and our 
mutual success.
Principle II At Aeon, we clearly document agreements with business partners, and 
strictly follow the letter of such agreements.
We maintain equality with our business partners, connected through 
formal agreements. Both parties strictly adhere to all agreed-upon contract 
provisions.
Principle III At Aeon, we respect business partners whose top priority is safety and 
customer peace of mind/assurance.
We and all of our business partners share the common goal of “Customer 
Satisfaction.” If the smallest doubt exists regarding the safety or trust of a 
62 Original Aeon Code is not numbered. Numbering is done by the author for convenience purposes.
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product or service, we work with our business partners to promptly 
ascertain the nature of the concern and resolve the issuer.
Principle IV At Aeon, we require our business partners to comply with both the letter 
and spirit of international standards and to practice them fully.
Aeon complies with and respects all generally recognized international 
standards, including those related to ISO, labor, environmental 
conservation, and quality management. We also require our business 
partners to strictly observe these same standards.
Principle V At Aeon, we do not tolerate the acceptance of gifts, money, or special 
favors from our business partners.
We select business partners based on their ability to offer better products 
and services at fair price. Individuals do not accept any gifts, money, or 
special treatment from a business partner designed to secure our business 
in any situation. All efforts must to forward benefits to the customers.
Compared with the Prima Code, the Aeon Code rises higher  than a unilateral expression 
of corporate policy or mere spirit, and focuses more specifically on relations with business 
partners. Also, in Principle IV of the Aeon Code, we can see a small sign of the shift from the 
second generation to the third generation, namely, the shift to getting nearer to a contract.
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E. Comparison of Codes of Conduct
Although the Aeon Code is one of the most advanced codes of conduct among Japanese 
corporations, there are still some gap between TNCs’ codes of conduct and the Aeon Code. Wal-
Mart, for instance, has a similar business structure to Aeon, but its code of conduct, titled 
“Standards for Suppliers”63 (“Wal-Mart Code”) applicable to Wal-Mart’s suppliers, is more 
concrete and detailed than the Aeon Code. The following chart shows a comparison between the 
Wal-Mart Code and the Aeon Code.
Aeon Wal-Mart
1 Legal nature Unilateral expression of 
policy on supplier
Agreement between Wal-Mart 
and supplier
2 Scope of application Business relation between 
Aeon and its all business 
partners including suppliers
Business relation between 
Wal-Mart and suppliers
3 Compliance with 
applicable laws
Abstractly mentioned Concretely mentioned
4 Employee 
compensation
Concretely mentioned
5 Hours of labor Concretely mentioned
6 Forced labor Concretely mentioned
7 Prison labor Concretely mentioned
8 Child labor Concretely mentioned
9 Discrimination/Human 
rights
Concretely mentioned
10 Workplace environment
Very abstract reference in 
Principle IV: “At Aeon, we 
require our business partners 
to comply with both the 
letter and spirit of 
international standards and 
to practice them fully.
Aeon complies with and 
respects all generally Concretely mentioned
63 Available at http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/SupplierStandardsdoc.pdf (last visited on Apr. 
20,2004).
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11 Concern for the 
environment
recognized international 
standards, including those 
related to ISO, labor, 
environmental conservation, 
and quality management. 
We also require our business 
partners to strictly observe 
these same standards.”
Concretely mentioned
12 Right of inspection Not mentioned Concretely mentioned
13 Right of unannounced 
factory inspection
Not mentioned Concretely mentioned
14 Termination of business 
relation
Not mentioned Concretely mentioned
15 Confidentiality Not mentioned Concretely mentioned
16 Gift and gratuity from 
supplier
Clearly prohibited Clearly prohibited
17 Disclosure of the code 
of conduct to 
employees of contract 
factory
Not mentioned Disclosed to employees in 
local language
18 Violation reporting 
system
Not mentioned Concretely mentioned
19 Counter signature by 
supplier
Not required Required
Among the many differences between the two codes, the most significant one is whether 
it creates legal rights and duties of the parties. Each section in the Wal-Mart Code begins with 
“[s]upplier shall” and it provides a penalty for a violation of the code by the supplier. To the 
contrary, there is no “shall” in the Aeon Code but rather, it says “respect” and “cooperate.” Only 
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Principle IV in the Aeon Code says “we require our business partners to comply.” There is, 
however, no penalty in the Aeon Code for violations of Principle IV by the supplier.
IV. Legal Analysis of a Japanese Code of Conduct and Its Prospect
As discussed in Part II, the legal risk under Japanese law arising from unfair labor 
practices in a foreign contract factory is low. Causes of action before a Japanese court, such as a 
violation of international law, tort or product liability, are remote for proceeding to a substantive 
court procedure. Accordingly, directors of Japanese corporations are not exposed to substantial 
legal risks related thereto, and have not needed to pay attention to those issues.
Among the many possible, but sometimes remote, causes of action before a Japanese 
court concerning unfair labor practices in a foreign contract factory, a director’s fiduciary duty 
would be the most viable one. A recent shareholder representative case in the Osaka District 
Court held that directors shall be responsible for constructing a risk control system 
corresponding to the scale and characteristics of business64:
“…for healthy operation, it is indispensable to have a clear grasp and control of various 
risks, namely risk control, arising from the type and nature of the business, such as credit 
risk, market risk, liquidity risk, office work risk, system risk, etc., and a risk control 
system (so-called internal control system) corresponding to the scale and characteristics
of the business of the corporation is required. As a board resolution is required for 
64 Supra note 48. Among many shareholders representative suits, the Osaka District Court Judgment is 
the latest one that explains the details of an “internal control system.”
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important business execution (Article 260(2) of the Commercial Code), the general 
principles of a risk control system, which are fundamental to the operation, shall be 
decided at a board meeting, and the representative director and director in charge shall 
decide, based on the general principles, the details of the risk control system of each 
department. In this context, directors, as a member of the board or the representative 
director or director in charge, shall be responsible to establish a risk control system and 
to monitor the performance of the representative director and director in charge, and this 
shall be also one element of the director’s duty of care and duty of loyalty65…” (“Osaka 
District Court Judgment)66 (underline added by the author).
It is not very clear whether the term “internal control system” in the Osaka District Court 
Judgment includes a code of conduct applicable to contract factories. However, considering the
two facts that the Aeon Code was adopted in April 2003, three years after the Osaka District 
Court Judgment, and there has been no court case dealing with a code of conduct and a director’s 
fiduciary duty so far, it might be too much to say that the judges of the Osaka District Court 
Judgment wrote “internal control system” with the intention to include or pay some attention to a 
code of conduct applicable to contract factories.
The situation, however, has changed since the Osaka District Court Judgment in 2000. 
There were many corporate scandals other than the Playstation case (2001) and the Prima Meat 
Packer case (2003) that have harmed consumer credibility and thereby financially damaged 
corporations. Nippon Foods, Inc. and Yukijirushi Foods, Co., Ltd. would be the two most 
65 See, supra note 47.
66 Supra note 48. English translation by the author. Japanese courts do not provide English translation of 
judgments, decisions and orders.
3561- text.native.1083271552 30
illustrative cases after the Osaka District Court Judgment. There was an outbreak of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (“BSE”), or mad cow disease, in Japan in 2001, and, to save the 
beef industry, the Japanese government started a purchase program under which the government 
purchases domestic beef from beef processors. The purchase program covered only domestic 
beef because BSE was confirmed only in domestic beef at that time67. Two major beef 
processors, Nippon Foods, Inc., and Yukijirushi Foods, Co., Ltd., misused the government’s 
purchase program. They camouflaged foreign beef as domestic beef so that their beef could be 
purchased by the government. After these deceptions came to light, Nippon Foods and 
Yukijirushi Foods, together with their parent corporations, suffered significant business and 
financial losses68. Further, because of sever criticism from consumers, Yukijirushi Foods, then a 
public corporation listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, had to go into bankrupt only three 
months after the deception was discovered69. 
The above cases fully show that Japan has entered a new era in which consumer 
credibility possesses the power of life and death over corporations. Corresponding to the new era, 
it is reasonably expected that a director’s fiduciary duty should also be heightened and 
expanded70. In fact, after the series of corporate scandals in the meat industry including the 
Prima case, Japanese corporations became more conscious of quality control in contract factories 
and, like Aeon, rapidly moved to adopt a code of conduct because of the fear of losing consumer 
credibility. This movement indicates that, in the new era after the corporate scandals in the meat 
67 Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper] (morning edition), Aug. 7, 2002, at 35.
68 Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper] (morning edition), Aug. 13, 2002, at 9.
69 Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper] (morning edition), May 1, 2002, at 13.
70 Supra note 50, at 226.
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industry, adopting a code of conduct to control contract factories is included in a director’s 
fiduciary duty, or, at least, directors have started thinking that they might be liable for a violation 
of this fiduciary duty if they do not adopt a code of conduct to prevent such scandals. 
Amplifying this tendency, after one corporation was criticized for its unfair labor practice in its 
foreign contract factories, it would be undeniable that adopting a code of conduct to prevent 
unfair labor practices in foreign contract factories should be included in a director’s fiduciary 
duty, or, at least, directors should start thinking that they might be liable for a violation of this 
fiduciary duty if they do not adopt a relevant code of conduct.
We can assume further a shareholder representative suit that pursues a violation of a 
director’s fiduciary duty in connection with a code of conduct and an unfair labor practice in 
foreign contract factories. Can adopting a code of conduct be a defense against a claim for a 
violation of a director’s fiduciary duty? Probably not, if such a code of conduct is in the second 
generation in Japan. Although the Osaka District Court Judgment is not perfectly clear on this 
point, it is not impossible to read that the Osaka District Court Judgment held implicitly that a 
director’s fiduciary duty is deemed fully performed when an internal control system is 
established, performed and monitored. Amplifying this thought, a director’s fiduciary duty is 
fully performed when a code of conduct is established, performed and monitored. As a result, the 
Japanese code of conduct has to evolve from the second generation to the third generation and to 
enhance its characteristics as a contract. Otherwise, it will not be able to assure the performance 
and monitoring of foreign contract factories.
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Conclusion
The codes of conduct of Japanese corporations have originated from a series of corporate 
scandals relating to the quality control of products. It might sound very “Japanese” and probably
shares its root with “kaizen”, Toyota’s famous way of improving the quality of products. 
 It is not believable, however, that Japanese corporations do not have anything to do with 
unfair labor practices in foreign contract factories for which TNCs are criticized. For example,
according to a statistics of the Japan External Trade Organization, a governmental corporation to 
promote import and export, in 2003 China was the largest exporter for Japan, and Indonesia was 
the fourth. The shares and volumes were 21.9%, approximately US$75.1 billion, and 15.4%,
approximately US$16.4 billion, respectively71. No one can guarantee that contract factories in 
these countries manufacturing products for U.S. corporations do not manufacture the same 
products for Japanese corporations.
As discussed in Part IV, a director’s fiduciary duty has changed with the change of 
society. In an era in which consumers became more conscious of unfair labor practices  in foreign 
contract factories, a director’s fiduciary duty also will have to cover such concerns to protect the 
corporation. The code of conduct of Japanese corporations will evolve by the interaction 
between law and society. Consumers’ consciousness of international human rights was 
heightened as the globalization of the economy progressed. Probably, the next turn to heighten 
the consciousness will be on the corporation side.
End
71 Available at http://www.jetro.go.jp/ec/j/trade (last visited on Apr. 20, 2004).
